David Ignatious has written an excellent piece on Brig. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Quds Force. It’s a quick read and has some good insights in it.The Quds Force is like a Persian hybrid of the French Foreign Legion and the Dulles-era CIA. While organizationally its placed within the Revolutionary Guard, it has often been reported that Soleimani reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The Mission Statement of the Quds Force is the export of Islamic Revolution, and to meet this goal it trains and supplies terrorist groups around the globe. Hezbollah is a Quds Force darling, as was the Northern Alliance against the Taliban back when America's only interest in Afghanistan was bemoaning exploded Buddahs. The US State Department has labeled the Quds Force a "Terrorist Organization", which is technically accurate but besides the point. First and foremost, the Quds Force works for Iranian interests.
Nowhere is this cleared than in Iraq. Ideologically, Muqtada al-Sadr is Iran's most natural ally. He is wants to establish a Shia Islamic state in Iran, and is no great fan of America. There is only one problem; the guy is a legitimate Iraqi nationalist. Unlike the Badr Brigade and the SIIC (Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the dominant mainstream Shia party), Sadr and his family sweated out the Saddam era in Baghdad. So while he is very willing to take those nice Iranian-made RPG's and shaped charges thankyouverymuch, he is much less comfortable taking his marching orders from a Persian sugar-daddy. The Badr Brigade and a large number of "moderate" Shia politicians make no such claim.
The alliance between Sadr and Iran is a marriage of convenience. Iran supplies the Madhi Army, and Sadr keeps America on its toes. So here is the question; what happens when it looks like the US is really out the door? This brings me back to Soleimani.
Iran would certainly prefer a nice pliable SIIC government next door than a demonstrated hardcase like Sadr. Currently, Iran supplies both sides of the Shia-Iraqi bloodfeud, largely to keep things fun for Coalition forces. So if Obama or McCain gets in and starts making serious motions towards getting out of dodge, what is Iran's response?
There are two ways of looking at this; either Iran wants the US stuck in Iraq, or it just wants America out of the neighborhood. Personally, I subscribe to Gary Brecher's theory that the US military would get seriously bloodied if we tried to take on Iran while we were in Iraq, due to the vulnerability of our ships in the Gulf and Iran's demonstrated ability to manage Iraqi insurgent groups. Keeping the US in Iraq allows Iran to score points off us largely free from retribution. But the Iranians may just figure that the past five years of war have worn out the American electorate's appetite for conflict, and having a large American presance next door is more likely to do harm than good. In that case, Soleimani may try to keep a lid on the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade as much as possible, so the US feels it is safe to leave.
Ok, so now here is the scenario. America has largely pulled out of the country, leaving behind a couple of "military advisers", pilots flying from Iraqi bases, and probably a handful of special-ops. The Iraqi army is still just the Badr Brigade dressed up in a different uniform. Sadr is probably the most popular Shia politician in Iraq, because he can claim that he is the only major player to have fought both Saddam and the Americans. But right there his advantages end. Sadr's best troops are the Quds-trained "Special Groups", but I wonder whether their loyalties lie more with Muqtada, or with their suppliers in Iran. Sadr will no longer be able to polish his rep by fighting and denouncing coalition forces.
At that point, whats to keep Soleimani from deciding that Iran can better retain influence in Iraq without the obstinate, nationalistic Sadr? Nobody wants to have chaos on their borders. So Sadr sees his supply lines from Iran largely dry up, and his best troops no longer heeding his call. At this point, Sadr's options become very limited. Once you look past his glower, theatrics, and penchant for impersonating Darth Vader on magazine covers, Sadr looks a lot like a guy who is riding a political movement rather than a guy who can maintain one. He might try his luck with democracy, but reports coming out of areas controlled by the Mahdi Army don't seem to indicate the sort of local support that continues on once the occupier has gone home.
Of course, all this is dependent on the assumption that the Iranians don't chose to continue to support Sadr after America leaves. Unfortunately, guys like Soleimani don't often submit themselves to teary, tell-all interviews with Barbra Walters. But I just cannot see the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army coexisting for long, and I cannot see Iran backing a gamble like Sadr when a known quantity like the SIIC exists.
Nowhere is this cleared than in Iraq. Ideologically, Muqtada al-Sadr is Iran's most natural ally. He is wants to establish a Shia Islamic state in Iran, and is no great fan of America. There is only one problem; the guy is a legitimate Iraqi nationalist. Unlike the Badr Brigade and the SIIC (Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the dominant mainstream Shia party), Sadr and his family sweated out the Saddam era in Baghdad. So while he is very willing to take those nice Iranian-made RPG's and shaped charges thankyouverymuch, he is much less comfortable taking his marching orders from a Persian sugar-daddy. The Badr Brigade and a large number of "moderate" Shia politicians make no such claim.The alliance between Sadr and Iran is a marriage of convenience. Iran supplies the Madhi Army, and Sadr keeps America on its toes. So here is the question; what happens when it looks like the US is really out the door? This brings me back to Soleimani.
Iran would certainly prefer a nice pliable SIIC government next door than a demonstrated hardcase like Sadr. Currently, Iran supplies both sides of the Shia-Iraqi bloodfeud, largely to keep things fun for Coalition forces. So if Obama or McCain gets in and starts making serious motions towards getting out of dodge, what is Iran's response?
There are two ways of looking at this; either Iran wants the US stuck in Iraq, or it just wants America out of the neighborhood. Personally, I subscribe to Gary Brecher's theory that the US military would get seriously bloodied if we tried to take on Iran while we were in Iraq, due to the vulnerability of our ships in the Gulf and Iran's demonstrated ability to manage Iraqi insurgent groups. Keeping the US in Iraq allows Iran to score points off us largely free from retribution. But the Iranians may just figure that the past five years of war have worn out the American electorate's appetite for conflict, and having a large American presance next door is more likely to do harm than good. In that case, Soleimani may try to keep a lid on the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade as much as possible, so the US feels it is safe to leave. Ok, so now here is the scenario. America has largely pulled out of the country, leaving behind a couple of "military advisers", pilots flying from Iraqi bases, and probably a handful of special-ops. The Iraqi army is still just the Badr Brigade dressed up in a different uniform. Sadr is probably the most popular Shia politician in Iraq, because he can claim that he is the only major player to have fought both Saddam and the Americans. But right there his advantages end. Sadr's best troops are the Quds-trained "Special Groups", but I wonder whether their loyalties lie more with Muqtada, or with their suppliers in Iran. Sadr will no longer be able to polish his rep by fighting and denouncing coalition forces.
At that point, whats to keep Soleimani from deciding that Iran can better retain influence in Iraq without the obstinate, nationalistic Sadr? Nobody wants to have chaos on their borders. So Sadr sees his supply lines from Iran largely dry up, and his best troops no longer heeding his call. At this point, Sadr's options become very limited. Once you look past his glower, theatrics, and penchant for impersonating Darth Vader on magazine covers, Sadr looks a lot like a guy who is riding a political movement rather than a guy who can maintain one. He might try his luck with democracy, but reports coming out of areas controlled by the Mahdi Army don't seem to indicate the sort of local support that continues on once the occupier has gone home. Of course, all this is dependent on the assumption that the Iranians don't chose to continue to support Sadr after America leaves. Unfortunately, guys like Soleimani don't often submit themselves to teary, tell-all interviews with Barbra Walters. But I just cannot see the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army coexisting for long, and I cannot see Iran backing a gamble like Sadr when a known quantity like the SIIC exists.
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